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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LIQrOR CONTROL CO~IMI8SION 
OF UTAH, 
Plaitntijf, 
NE'V YORK CASUALTY COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Intervenor, 
vs. 
C. V. LACK and CHRIS E. ATHAS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7738 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
SUPPORTING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
C. E. ATHAS 
Comes now the respondent, Chris E. Athas, and 
respectfully prays for the Court to grant a rehearing 
in this cause for the following plain, serious and funda-
mental errors of both ommission and commission : 
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This decision is the second by this Court on this 
appeal. The first decision was on respondent's motion to 
dismiss the appeal. Point I relates to the matter of a 
more definite statement, and Point II to the failure to 
state a claim. 
I. 
THE OPINION FIRST UPHOLDS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, 
AND THEN ERRONEOUSLY NULLIFIES THIS AF-
FIRMANCE BY ASSUMPTIONS WHICH ARE 
WRONG IN F'ACT AND LAW, AND ARE CON-
TRARY TO THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISION 
HEREIN. 
A. The Trial Court's decision and judgment of dis-
missal were after refusal to furnish a more definite 
statement, and are dispositive of this case under Rule 
12( e). 
B. The affirmance here of the correctness of the 
Trial Court's decision necessarily ends this case, for: 
1. Rule 12( e) was properly applied. 
2. Our motion here to dismiss this appeal 
squarely raised the question as to whether on appellant's 
refusal to plead a more definite statement the case had 
been finally dismissed, on that ground. If not, the appeal 
would have had to be dismissed. 
· 3. On that motion, the appellant contended 
it had been so dismissed and asked the Court to permit 
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it to an1end the order dis1nissing and its notice of appeal 
so as to make certain both its waiver of any right to 
amend, and also the final dis1nissal on. this ground. 
4. This Court, by allowing this amendment 
and denying our Inotion to dis1niss the appeal necessarily, 
and in fact, held : 
a. That appellant, by refusal to furnish 
the more definite statmnent when ordered, had so waived, 
and final dis1nissal had properly followed. 
b. Also that the case should proceed by 
appeal to decision upon the merits, on this ground; as it 
did. 
5. Thus appellant's waiver, under Rule 12 (e), 
and this Court's first decision based thereon, and the 
opinion now affirming the judgment of the Trial Court 
must end this case. 
C. The revival and sending of the case back for any 
further procedure on this complaint is therefore wrong, 
and the two off-hand assumptions indulged in the opin-
ion have no place in the case at all, and are erroneous and 
confusing. 
The first of these assumptions is that both the mo-
tions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and that for 
a more definite statement, "cannot consistently be 
granted." This is erroneous and can have no effect here, 
for: 
1. The reasons just stated under 1-B, supra. 
2. This Court had herein previously held con-
trary to this. 
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3. Appellant has waived herein the benefit of 
any such additional claim, and any right to have a re-
versal of the dismissal judgment, except on the merits 
as raised below and here, and neither party has raised 
or had a chance to be heard on this. 
4. This Court has accepted and acted upon ap-
pellant's said waiver. 
5. It is contrary to the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
6. It is bad in law. 
The second erroneous assumption stated in the opin-
ion is: "We presume that appellant's election to stand 
upon its compliant was based primarily upon the ruling 
of the Trial Court, that the complaint did not state a 
claim .... " This, likewise, is entirely wrong, and is not 
available for the above and these additional reasons: 
1. It is contrary to the repeated assertions of 
its position by appellant, itself, herein, and on which 
it was able to sustain its appeal. 
2. It is inconsistent with and contrary to the 
basis upon which this Court allowed appellant to make 
the amendments on appeal heretofore referred to, and 
upon which our motion to dismiss the appeal was denied. 
3. It has no basis in the record, but is plainly 
contrary thereto, and appellant has made no such claim, 
and respondent has had no chance to be heard on such. 
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IT. 
AS TO RESPONDENT'S :MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR FAILURE TO STATE..:\ CLAil\f, THE COURT 
HAS, WE BELIEVE, SERIOUSLY ERRED BY AS-
SERTING FOR APPELLANT A THEORY OF LIA-
BILITY NOT PLEADED AND NOT CLAIMED, AND 
ALSO IX IGNORIXG THE ISSUES ACTUALLY 
FR~-\.~IED AXD PRESENTED ON THE APPEAL. 
This appears, because : 
1. The recital of the opinion that the complaint 
states a clain1 of conversion of liquor by act of this re-
spondent raises a purely moot issue. 
2. There is no such allegation as a conclusion, 
or otherwise. 
3. The appellant, in its complaint and brief, 
has asserted a factual basis and theory of liability en-
tirely different from this. 
4. Appellant has plainly indicated by its 
briefs, here and in the Court below, that it did not intend 
or want to allege such theory of liability; it plainly has 
refused to amend to so allege. 
5. The decision ignores the briefs of both par-
ties, and the issues therein supported and upon which 
the parties seek decision herein, namely: 
a. Does respondent's partnership relation-
ship with Lack, under facts as alleged by appellant, 
render respondent liable for delicts and failure to account 
by Lack1 
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b. And, where a complaint alleges facts 
which state a theory of conversion and liability, can a 
mere conclusion of conversion, if one appears, be given 
a different effect, or any effect~ 
c. Note that, if the Court had considered 
these two legal points and the authorities as briefed in 
support thereof, the Court would not have fallen into this 
error, and the parties would not have a different and 
unwanted law suit imposed upon them. 
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT 
The petition is quite in detail. We hope by this to 
make our position clearer, avoid explanation, and also, 
call attention to the rules of law and procedure relied 
upon. 
Most of the rules are so well understood and uni-
formly applied that they need not be supported by cita-
tion of authority. 
Some reference to the record here on the motion to 
dismiss the appeal, as well as to the record and briefs 
on the appeal, are necessary to correct some serious mis-
understandings. 
I. 
THE OPINION FIRST UPHOLDS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, 
AND THEN ERRONEOUSLY NULLIFIES THIS AF-
FIRMANCE BY ASSUMPTIONS WHICH ARE 
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"\YRON"G IN F~-\CT AND LA "\V, AND ARE CON-
TRARY TO THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISION 
HEREIN. 
I- A and B 
In first discussing what we believe is the conclusive 
effect of sustaining the order dismissing the complaint 
after refusal to furnish a nwre definite statement, we 
rely on the evident and controlling proposition, that: 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
'VHEN AFFIR:JIED ON APPEAL ENDS THE CASE. 
The contrary detennination here is because basic 
factors, of law and of fact, have been overlooked. 
To plaintiff's complaint (R. 1), this respondent di-
rected two motions (R. 16), one under Civil Rule 12(b), 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and one under 
Rule 12(e), for a more definite statement. 
On Jan. 31, 1951 ( R. 20), the Trial Court separately 
sustained each of these motions (R. 20) and gave the 
plaintiff ten days in which to amend. On Aug. 1, 1951 (R. 
21), the appellant filed its Notice of "Election To Stand 
On Original Complaint," stating that it "hereby elects to 
stand upon its original complaint as against defendant 
Chris E. Athas and take judgment ... as regards said 
defendant." 
On Aug. 1, 1951, appellant moved the Court (R. 24) 
for, and on Aug. 7, prepared and got a judgment of dis-
missal. This order again recited that appellant had 
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"elected to stand upon its original complaint." On this 
same day it filed its Notice of Appeal (R. 23), and pur-
suant thereto the record was filed in this Court. 
Proceedings on Motion To Dismiss Appeal: 
We cite now some material proceedings here in this 
Court on our motion filed Oct. 19, 1951, to dismiss the 
appeal, because the decisions of the Court, based on the 
position on both sides then taken, is entirely inconsistent 
with the opinion now. This Court's record can be cited 
only by dates of documents. 
From the wording of the Order of Dismissal and 
the Notice of Appeal (R. 22, 23) just mentioned, it was 
not clear that appellant intended to appeal from the effect 
of the order of the Trial Court in sustaining respondent's 
motion for a more definite statement, i.e., on both mo-
tions and grounds of dismissal. 
We, therefore, relied, in our motion to dismiss this 
appeal, upon the principle that an appeal will be dis-
missed where taken only on one ground of decision, or so 
that if the trial Judge were reversed on the ground ap-
pealed, the case would still stand dismissed on other 
grounds. In other words, if the decision of the matter 
appealed would not settle the case. On this we cited in 
our memo, filed Oct. 22 and Oct. 31, 1951 : 
Flourney v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, a case directly 
in point on the proposition, that if this was it the appeal 
should be dismissed; and also, among additional author-
ity, a case in the Eighth Circuit: 
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Hunter v. Federal Life In;)urance Co., 103 F. (2) 192, 
and quoted Judge Sanborn on the similar attempt there, 
that "It is well settled that a case may not be brought 
here by ... appeal in frag1nents ;"etc. 
Hendrick;) l'. O;)man, et al, Hi-± P. 2d 545, holding that 
the defendant was entitled to the benefit of his special 
den1urrer based on the ground that the complaint was 
"insufficient to appraise the defendants of the claim they 
must meet:'' and also holding that the case was properly 
and finally disposed of by dismissal upon such special 
demurrer after refusal of the defendant to amend. 
Bamberger, et al v. Certified Prod. Inc., 53 P. 2d 
1153, at 1155 (Ut.), was also cited and we quoted this 
Court that "the remedy for uncertainty or unintelli-
gibility in a pleading lies in a special demurrer, which is 
equivalent to a motion to make more certain, .. .. " 
Neither the appellant or the Court raised any ques-
tion as to these settled principles. But, both set about to 
make certain that the judgment of dismissal on this 
ground of uncertainty was final, and the appeal from it 
clear and definite. 
In its answer to our motion filed herein Oct. 24, 1951, 
the appellant, after alleging (P. 1) that the Trial Court, 
on the 31st day of Jan., 1951, had granted both of appel-
lant's motions, said: 
"That plaintiff elected to stand on its com-
plaint, took judgment against it upon the order 
referred to above, and this appeal is taken from 
that judgment." 
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The order "referred to" sustained both our motions. 
And on our contention that appellant, by moving 
the dismissal of its own complaint had waived the right 
to now appeal therefrom, appellant denied such waiver, 
but, admitted it had waived its right to amend its com-
plaint. 
Appellant alleged : 
"d. Referring to paragraph 4 of defendant's 
(respondent's) motion, plaintiff alleges that said 
motion (i.e. to dismiss its own complaint (R. 24) ) 
was made and filed at the same time and in con-
nection with plaintiff's notice of election to stand 
on its original complaint, that it was made for the 
purpose of procuring from the court a final ap-
pealable order, and that it shows on its face and 
in connection with the record herein that it does 
not constitute a waiver of any right of plaintiff 
herein except the right to amend its complaint." 
Thus, it is admitted and asserted, as it must be, to 
sustain appellant's right to appeal, that it had waived 
its right to amend its complaint as to this ground; and 
this is clearly the legal effect of such refusal. In other 
words, a party cannot stand on his complaint and refuse 
to furnish a more definite statement after being ordered 
so to do, and then, after judgment of dismissal, and after 
the affirmance of such judgment on appeal, still amend 
and proceed on the complaint. 
But further, and of equal or greater importance, 
on this is the fact that the appellant, in its said answer, 
and so that this Court would definitely treat the judg-
10 
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ment of dismissal as applying to both decisions of the 
Trial Court, also n1ade a motion ( P. 2) to amend, 
"the judgment of dismissal as to Defendant 
Athas (R. :2:2), and that the words 'and said de-
fendant's n10tion for a more definite statement' 
be added." 
Having so waived right to an1end its complaint and 
so applied to arnend the judg1nent thereon, then appel-
lant supported this 1notion to amend by a brief filed 
herein Oct. 26, in which its position is thus made clear 
(P. 1): 
"Fron1 an, examination of the record it is 
obvious that plaintiff's objective is and has al-
ways been to have the order of January 31st 
reviewed by this court in its entirety ... an ex-
amination of plaintiff's brief on file herein shows 
that plaintiff's statement of points and argument 
includes the order of the district court granting 
the motion for more definite statement." 
''Whether the trial court had ordered that 
the complaint be stricken on one motion and dis-
missed on the other, or whether it ordered the 
complaint dismissed on both motions is immaterial 
here. The facts are, of course, that the action 
was dismissed because of plaintiff's refusal to 
amend on both grounds, and the appeal is based 
on the theory that the complaint is good as re-
gards both motions .... " 
"The effect of the amendments proposed by 
the plaintiff would be to indicate clearly and un-
equivocally that the appeal is taken to review the 
order of the trial court made January 31, 1951, 
on both the motion to dismiss and the motion for 
a more definite statement. (R. 20)" 
11 
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So that when this Court, on this record, December 
3, 1951, entered its order that appellant's motion for per-
mission to amend "was granted," and on the same day 
entered its order that respondent's motion to dismiss 
appeal "was denied," it necessarily decided and settled 
in this case, that : 
Rule 12(e) was properly applied and this case was, 
by the Trial Court, appropriately dismissed thereunder. 
That the Court below not only could, but did, grant 
both motions, and that the case had been finally dismissed 
by orders applying to both. 
That the appeal was from the order of dismissal 
as to each motion, and that it should proceed on the 
merits of the Court's decision as to each. 
That appellant, by refusal to furnish the more def-
inite statement when ordered by the Trial Court, had 
waived its right "to amend the complaint," as it said it 
had_, otherwise, the action below would not be final. 
Also that the "effect of the amendment proposed" 
was "to indicate clearly and unequivocally that the appeal 
is taken to review the order of the Trial Court on • • • the 
motion for a more definite statement." 
How can this Court now say it couldn't be. or wasn't 
so appealed? 
Decision Upon the Merits : 
The writer of the opinion here, we believe, was not 
on the Court when the foregoing record and decision were 
made here, and probably was not familiar with them. 
12 
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However, the opinion does seem to consider that the 
Trial Court's decision upon the Inotion for a more def-
inite state1uent was thus appealed on the merits and it 
affirn1s that decision. It ~:my8 that certain of the allega-
tions "Lead to confusion and ambiguity both in legal 
theory and fact," and "we believe the instant case clearly 
to be one where the nwtion was properly made and 
granted." So that both motions were considered on their 
merits and the decision of the Trial Court on this motion 
was approved and upheld. 
This, we think, ended this case just as effectively in 
every respect as if the granting of the first motion, to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, had been approved 
and affirmed by this Court. There is no reason why these 
final orders of dismissal as to these motions stood upon 
any different basis. 
It is true that there was no necessity for this Court 
deciding as to the Trial Court's ruling upon both of them, 
because the decision that the order of dismissal based on 
either was correct, would necessarily dispose of the case. 
The authorities cited infra, show that when two mo-
tions of the character of these are presented to an Ap-
pellate Court, it may, and often does, dispose of the case, 
affirming the Trial Court on the special demurrer or on 
this kind of motion. And it appears that such affirmance 
does and must dispose of the case. 
3 Am. J ur ., Page 677 
"1166. Eff'ect of Affirmance. It may be 
stated generally that a judgment of affirmance is 
13 
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a determination by the appellate court that the 
proceeding under review is free from prejudicial 
error. Such action ends the case in the appellate 
court and deprives such court of all power to add 
to, or alter, the record as certified, by rescinding 
the order of affirmance and dismissing the appeal. 
All questions raised by the assignments of error 
and all questions that might have been so raised 
are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against 
the appellant or plaintiff in error, and the judg-
ment affirmed must be regarded as free from all 
error." 
Decisions in support of this rule are necessarily those 
in review of lower or intermediate Courts. Because, if 
the highest Courts choose to disregard the rules, opin-
ions are not generally written in correction of that. 
However, in the next case, the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals did reverse itself, and this was 
approved by the Supreme Court. It is the same rule ap-
plied in any court, when a judgment has become really 
final. 
In Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 284 U.S. 
547, 76 L. Ed. 476, the rule is fully discussed. 
Respondent obtained a judgment in the Trial Court 
for breach of contract of employment and an appeal to 
the Circuit Court resulted in affirmance. But, in the 
meantime, appellant on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence applied to the Circuit Court to send the case 
back to the trial Court. So that the order of the Cir-
cuit Court also permitted .the Trial Court to so proceed 
to hear this. 
14 
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After further proceedings in the Trial Court, there 
was a second appeal to the Circuit Court. It then decided 
that having affirn1ed the judgment of the Trial Court 
previously, it could not send the case back, as it did, to 
the Trial Court for further proceedings. 
Justice Roberts, in an opinion sustaining the Circuit 
Court on thi~, cites the statute by which the Supreme 
Court and also the Circuit Court of Appeals exercise 
authority on appeals, and like Rule 76(a) of our Crvil 
Rules, they have the authority to "reverse, affirm, or 
modify.'' In addition to this the authority of these Fed-
eral Courts, on remand, is broader than the authority 
of this Court under Rule 76(a). However, on affirmance, 
the rule is the same. And after stating the facts, the 
opinion says : ( 4 79) 
"But the claim is that Sec. 701 of the Re-
vised Statutes, U.S.C. title 28, Sec. 876, which de-
fines our appellate jurisdiction, and is made ap-
plicable to the Circuit Courts of Appeal * * • 
authorizes these Courts * * * to set aside a judg-
ment and receive additional evidence, if justice 
so requires, and that such power may also be ex-
ercised by remanding the cause to the trial court 
for similar proceedings. 
• • • • 
"Stress is placed upon the point that in addi-
tion to mere power to affirm, reverse or modify, 
jurisdiction is given in the alternative to order 
such judgment to be rendered or such further 
proceedings to be had by the inferior court as the 
justice of the case may require * * * though there 
be no error upon the face of the record the section 
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authorizes its return to the lower court for the 
opening of the judgment and reception of newly 
discovered evidence * * *. 
• • • • 
"The section has been construed as applying 
to cases where a judgment or decree is affirmed 
upon appeal and further proceedings in the'court 
below are appropriate in aid of the relief granted. 
And the statute warrants the giving of directions 
by an appellate court for further proceedings be-
low in conformity with a modification or a re-
versal of a judgment where, in consequence of 
such action, such proceedings should be had * • *. 
... . . . 
"Nothing was there said to indicate that this 
court would order further proceedings below to 
attack or set aside a judgment entered on a record 
which disclosed no error calling for a modification 
or reversal. No authority is cited in which Rev. 
Stat. S.ec. 701, U.S.C. title 28, Sec. 876, has been 
construed as extending this court's powers in 
the manner for which petitioner contends • • •. 
"In the present case there is a further con-
clusive reason why the remission of the cause to 
the District Court was ineffective to give author-
ity to hear the motion to set aside the judgment. 
Upon the original appeal the Circuit Court of 
Appeals found no error in the record and affirmed 
the judgment • • *. 
"The attempt by remanding the record with 
leav·e to the court below to take action which would 
otherwise have been beyond its powers left the 
matter precisely as if no such order had been 
made." 
Edwards v. Hoevet, (Or.) 200 P. 2d, 955. 
16 
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This is a more recent case cited under the above 
quotation from A.M. JUR. In it the Trial Court entered 
a judgment granting defendant's motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. And then also 
granted a new trial. The case went to the Supreme Court 
of Oregon which approved the judgment, and the opinion 
by Chief Justice Rossn1an after disposing of this affirm-
ance, considered the order granting a new trial, and said: 
(962) 
"We believe that under the circumstances the 
award of a new trial should be deemed nothing 
more than a statement of the trial judge's ap-
praisal of the record. It was entirely proper to 
make the award, but since the judgment, which 
was entered notwithstanding the verdict, must be 
affirmed, the award of the new trial becomes 
functus officio. 
Rapalje and Lawrence's Law Dictionary, Vol. I 
"FUNCTUS OFFICIO. An expression ap-
plied to an agent or donee of an authority who 
has performed the act authorized, so that the au-
thority is exhausted and at an end." 
So it would seem that when this Court had affirmed 
the final judgment of dismissal, there was nothing fur-
ther to be done in the Trial Court. It was as if there had 
been no appeal taken. 
Erroneous Revival of Case: 
We refer the Court to this section 1-C of the motion 
for a statement of the assumptions now referred to. 
17 
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Notwithstanding, the disposition of the motion to 
dismiss the appeal in this case on this clear record that 
the appellant's "objective is and always has been * • * 
to indicate clearly and unequivocally that the appeal is 
taken to review the order on both the motion to dismiss 
and for a more definite statement." The opinion now 
says that the appellant's election to stand on its com-
plaint was not based on the Trial Court's decision on this 
latter matter, but "primarily" on the other ground. A 
presumption could be no more erroneous, or out of place. 
We also attempted to "presume" that the appeal was 
based on the other motion, and tried to get it dismissed 
on that presumption, and we were promptly challenged 
by the appellant, and then corrected by this Court. 
And, when this Court entered its order based on the 
foregoing record, it necessarily recognized the right of 
the Trial Court to rule on and grant both these motions, 
and the necessity and propriety of the appeal on both. 
This opinion now seems to reverse this, in saying, "both 
motions cannot consistently be granted." Because it 
is very obvious that this Court, in granting appellant's 
amendment and denying our motion to dismiss the ap-
peal, was not then of the opinion that "both motions 
cannot consistently be granted." If so, it would have 
made quick disposition of our motion to dismiss the ap-
peal. 
Unless this statement in the opinion and the intent of 
the Court as to the effect of this are here clarified, both 
18 
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the Trial Court in this case, and the bench and bar in 
every case involving Rule 12, will be in hopeless confu-
sion. 
How can the Trial Court proceed' Is it to assume 
that because it may han_~ not acted "consistently" it didn't 
act at all on this matter 1 Also, that this Court, in affirm-
ing this judgment of dismissal, didn't 3:ct at all~ This 
statement, if taken as the decision in this case, certainly 
· will change the established practice, and we believe it 
is plainly contrary to intent of Rule 12, itself. 
This rule not only permits, but requires, that these 
two motions, if n1ade, be made together or the right to 
make one is waived. 
2 Moore's Federal Practice, (2d Edition) Section 
12.19: 
"If any other motion under Rule 12 is made 
before serving a responsive pleading, the motion 
for a more definite statement must be consolidated 
with it or it is waived." 
This Rule so applies, not only to these two motions, 
but to all of the motions provided under (b), (c) and (e) 
of the Rule, and (g) says that he must make all "objec-
tions then available to hirn which this Rule permits to be 
raised by motion" and unless he does so "he shall not 
thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses." 
There are two exceptions, but neither o.f these affects 
the motion under consideration now. 
There are, in (b), (c) and (e) of this Rule, nine dif-
ferent motions that could all be available, and if relied 
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upon, all must be made in the one motion, and seven of 
them would be waived if not included in the one motion. 
The rule of procedure indicated by this statementin 
the opinion here, would appear to make it erroneous for 
the Court, in then acting upon the motion so consoli-
dated, to grant n10re than one of these motions at a time 
because each of them, if granted, would dispose of the 
case. For exmnple, the ruling on one, "lack of jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter," would then dispose of the 
case. And in the language of the opinion, it is only when 
the Court has jurisdiction, "that a (any) motion under 
Rule 12-e (or 12-b) can be properly considered." 
So the question now is whether the Court should rule 
on as many of these as are made, so that one order, and 
one appeal, would enable the Appellate Court to dispose 
of all the defenses raised by motion, or whether the Trial 
Court should simply rule upon one, because if it should 
grant that one "no responsive pleading is required and 
any further attack upon the pleading is useless." We 
have shown supra, in reviewing our motion to dismiss 
the appeal, that an Appellate Court would not hear such 
appeal, because it may not settle the case. 
And, there is no difference in ranking here as be-
tween the n1otion for a more definite statement and any 
of the other motions, so far as disposing of the case is 
concerned. In fact, 12 (e) makes the disposition of the 
case mandatory if the order for a more definite statement 
"is not obeyed within ten days." On this, the parties have 
agreed here. So that there is absolutely no difference, 
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as we have already indicated, between this Court's refus-
ing to dispose of this case upon affirming the judgment 
as to this motion, and its so refusing to dispose of the 
case if it had affirmed the Trial Court on the other mo-
tion, for failure to state a claim. 
We believe this staten1ent in the opinion will intro-
duce a new systmn of successive appeals, contrary to the 
intent of Rule 12. No authority is cited in the opinion in 
support of the staten1ent, and we can find none. 
It is plainly contrary to the rules and practice of 
this Court to inject these assumptions into this case and 
then give them the full effect of reversing the case. 
No such matters were presented to the Trial Court. 
Appellant has made no such claim or contention. 
These are contrary to the claims that appellant did 
make in this Court. 
They are contrary to the position this Court took in 
its first decision herein. 
We never have had a chance to defend as to either 
of these. 
In Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, et al, 242 P. 2d 297 (Mar. 
25, 1952), this Court has ruled squarely that it would not 
consider such things, even if claimed on appeal, because, 
"We feel constrained not to review those 
matters which plaintiff cannot defend against be-
cause not called to attention by her opponents." 
21 
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The only consistent conclusion on the entire record 
is that appellant did not want to, and would not amend, 
to make the complaint more certain, because they have 
continued to claim that the one theory they relied upon 
and wanted to plead was sufficiently clear. This was a 
partnership liability theory. 
Why can't the parties choose their own theories of 
claim and defense in this case, like any other case 1 
3 Am. Jur., P. 372: 
830: "Limitation to Theory Presented Be-
low. The well-settled rule which requires the 
parties to adhere on appeal to the theory upon 
which they presented the case in the trial court op-
erates to limit the scope of the review, since the 
authorities are agreed on the proposition that the 
case, on appeal, must be reviewed and decided on 
the theory on which it was tried in the court be-
low, and that the theory upon which the case was 
submitted in the trial court should be treated as 
the law of the case on appeal. 
* * * • 
831 : "The reviewing court will treat the 
pleadings as the parties elected to treat them in 
the court below and will adhere to the construc-
tion given them by the trial court." 
Affirmance of Judgment of Dismissal Ends Case: 
We cite now some additional authorities on this ax-
iomatic proposition, and also holding that the two mo-
tions should be presented together and decided together, 
as the rule indicates. 
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The law has been so firn1ly settled on this in deci-
sions dealing with general and special demurrers, that 
apparently few cases haYe been presented under the later 
Rules where these objections are taken by motions. 
In Bamberger, et al, c. Certified Productions, Inc., 
53 P. 2d at1155 (rtah 1936), this Court said: 
"Ordinarily the remedy for uncertainty or 
unintelligibility in a pleading lies in a ·special 
demurrer which is equivalent to a motion to make 
more certain, and not in a motion to strike." 
See also, State v. Rolio, 262 P. 987 (Ut. 1927). 
1 Bancroft, Code Pleading Practice and Remedies 
(1937 Ed.) 
"Section 207 (Ambiguity, Unintelligibility 
and Uncertainty). In General. In some jurisdic-
tions the objection that a pleading is ambiguous, 
unintelligibile, or uncertain, is one to be taken by 
special demurrer, not by a motion to strike. The 
demurrer is equivalent to a motion to make more 
certain." 
Herman v. Mutttal Life Insurance Co. of N. Y., 108 
F. (2) 678, 682 (C.A. 3rd 1939), cited at Page 54 of our 
original brief, seems to be a case where the propriety of 
deciding both motions together was assumed. The lower 
Court sustained a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim. The upper Court affirmed after discussing in 
elaborate detail several possible or conceivable claims 
suggested by the complaint. The Court said at the end 
of the opinion : 
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"In conclusion we might call counsel's atten-
tion to Rule 12 (e) of the new Rules. We have 
been constrained to attempt a rather elaborate 
opinion largely because the complaint seemed cap-
able of varied interpretations. A resort to Rule 
12 (e) would, by definition, have resulted in the 
necessary certainty." 
Thus the Court intimates that it would have been 
proper for the Court below to have sustained a motion 
for a more definite statement also. 
Hendricks v. Osman, et al, (Cal.) 164 P. 2d 545 
(1946), supra. This case is almost identical with the 
case at bar. To the complaint the defendants filed a 
general demurrer charging that it "failed to state facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action," and also a 
special demurrer charging that the complaint "was un-
certain and unintelligible in certain alleged particulars." 
The Trial Court sustained both these demurrers and gave 
Plaintiff ten days to amend. Plaintiff elected to stand 
upon his complaint rather than amend. The Court sus-
tained the ruling of the Trial Court on the special dem-
urrer and thereupon affinned the judgment. The opin-
ion (546) says: 
"It is clearly the law that one who declines 
to avail himself of leave to amend his complaint 
after a demurrer thereto has been sustained, 
which demurrer is both general and special, there-
by must stand upon his pleading as against both 
grounds of demurrer, and if the complaint is 
objectionable on any ground the judgment of dis-
missal must be affirmed." 
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Powell r. Lampton, 85 P. ~d 495, 496 (Cal. App. 
1938). The lower court entered a judg1nent of dismissal 
rendered after a general and special den1urrer were in-
terposed, the special was sustained for uncertainty. The 
upper Court affinned holding·, "The dmnurrer was prop-
erly sustained. The allegations of the complaint are 
clearly uncertain." The case stood dismissed. 
California Trust Co. v. Cohn, 7 P. 2d 297 (Calif. 
1932). This is an appeal by the defendants from a judg-
ment of dismissal entered when a demurrer to their 
second amended cross-complaint was sustained. The de-
fendants were given leave to amend and refused to do 
so. The Court stated the rule as follows: 
"A plaintiff, or cross-complainant, who de-
clines to avail himself of leave to amend his plead-
ing after a demurrer thereto is sustained, which 
demurrer is both general and special, must stand 
upon his pleading as against both grounds of 
demurrer." 
Aalwyn v. Cobe, 142 P. 79 (Calif. 1914). The lower 
Court sustained a general and special demurrer to the 
complaint. The complaint was su~sequently dismissed. 
The ground for special demurrer was that the complaint 
was "uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible." The 
Court held: 
"For this uncertainty and the ambiguity of 
the allegations, the special demurrer was properly 
sustained." 
Also, 
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"A plaintiff who has declined to amend his 
complaint after a demurrer sustained, which is 
both general and special, must stand upon his 
pleading as against both grounds of demurrer." 
Martinovich v. Wooley, 60 P. 760 (Calif.1900). To 
the complaint of plaintiff a general and special demurrer 
was interposed. The demurrer was sustained, and plain-
tiff, declining to amend, appealed from the order of dis-
missal subsequently entered. The Court affirmed, say-
ing: 
"Plaintiff, having declined to amend, must 
stand upon his pleading." 
Winchell v. Strawbridge, 266 P. 539. An appeal from 
a judgment for defendants, based upon an order sustain-
ing both general and special demurrers to the amended 
complaint, plaintiff having declined to amend the com-
plaint. The court affirmed holding that "numerous 
grounds of uncertainty and ambiguity exist in the plead-
ing." 
Rule 12 (e) directly requires dismissal for refusal 
to amend here, and the most serious effect of the opinion 
is that IT COMPLETELY NULLIFIES RULE 12(e). 
II. 
AS TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, THE COURT HAS, WE 
BELIEVE, SERIOUSLY ERRED BY ASSERTING FOR 
APPELLANT A THEORY OF LIABILITY NOT PLEADED 
AND NOT CLAIMED, AND ALSO IN IGNORING THE 
ISSUES ACTUALLY FRAMED AND PRESENTED ON THE 
APPEAL. 
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On this division, we again refer the Court to II 
of the 1notion for a full staten1ent of our position, as now 
discussed. 
The principal error as we see it here is that the 
Court has asserted a theory of liability that is neither 
alleged, claiined, or relied upon, and has refused to 
decide the issue alleged and presented. 
The Court's Theory of Liability: 
The opinion states that a "conclusion of conversion" 
by respondent is alleged. That the appellant has done 
this "by alleging in substance a conversion by both de-
fendants after delivery of the liquor to a single defend-
ant, Lack, * * *" We pointed out in our brief (P. 13, 
22-27) that we found in the complaint no allegation of 
conversion of liquor at all, and particularly no allega-
tion of any possession or handling or conversion of liquor 
by respondent at all. Appellant did not question this 
or assert that there was such. It asserted a completely 
different factual theory. So this· seems to end the 
Court's conclusion theory, so far as the parties are con-
cerned. 
And, the complaint doesn't say, as asserted in the 
last line, second paragraph of the opinion, that "defend-
ants failed to account and have converted," etc. 
What it alleges is the delivery of a million dollars 
worth of liquor to "the possession of" Lack, its agent, 
for purpose of sale as agreed. It then alleges its sale, 
and then says that for part of the liquor sold, "defend-
ants failed * * * to account * * * and that, THERE-
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FORE, (i.e. "for that reason, because of that, on that 
ground") the * * * defendants wrongfully converted the 
value thereof." This is different from saying that they 
failed to account for the value "and" also that they con-
verted. 
But, 1n any event, both parties here have tried to 
convince the Court that the appellant didn't attempt 
or want to allege that respondent, himself, personally 
ever possessed or converted any liquor. If appellant had 
wanted to plead that, it certainly would have done so. 
The Rules provided a form, Rule 84, Form 11, Page 165, 
whereby this could have been alleged in twenty-five 
words. 
So that the theory of liability asserted in this opin-
ion is imposed upon the parties here without claim or 
support by appellant, or chance for defense by respond-
ent. 
Appellant's Real Claim of Liability: 
And there should be no confusion or doubt as to 
appellant's sole theory of liability against respondent. 
It is presented by elaborate allegations of contract rela-
tionship between Lack and the appellant to operate a 
package agency, and also allegations of Lack's partner-
ship with respondent in the conduct of a pharmacy in 
the same premises on which the liquor agency was oper-
ated. Then the allegations of the delivery there of a 
million dollars worth of liquor, to the possession of 
Lack for sale, and then the sale and failure to account 
for part of this. 
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From these, appellant claitned conversion by Lack, 
and then liability for his acts, on the part of respondent, 
because of this related partnership business. Cases and 
authorities were cited upon this theory of partnership 
liability, and none on any other theory. 
And again we c01nnwnted that apparently no other 
theory of conversion was intended to be pleaded and 
presented (P. 28), also reasons and some authorities 
to sho'v that none other was actually pleaded. Appellant 
made no contrary clai1n as to this. On the contrary, in 
its brief it especially e1nphasized that this was its sole 
theory. Thus it said (P. 5): 
·• 'The theory of plaintiff is that where a 
conversion occurs in the course of operation of 
a partnership, each partner may be held liable 
* * * regardless of knowledge * * *.' And, again 
(P. 6): 'Plaintiff's position is * * * if one partner 
converted a portion thereof, then all partners 
may be held * * *'; and (P. 6) : 'This theory is 
fundamental to plaintiff's position so far as de-
fendant Athas is concerned.'" 
The appellant's position could hardly be clearer. 
Its persistence in claiming this was its theory, and that 
it was sufficiently pleaded, and its refusal to amend 
below and throughout the proceedings on the motion to 
dismiss the appeal, was repeated on the argument on 
the appeal. So it is difficult for us to understand the 
reluctance on the part of this Court, in this case, to 
believe that the parties know what they want to plead 
and present here. 
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There are particular reasons in this case why the 
respondents didn't, and would not want to, plead the 
theory suggested by the Court and would insist upon 
their theory as we pointed out in our brief (P. 29). The 
facts of this loss had all been developed through two 
long trials and presented before the judges of this Court, 
establishing that the loss was not due to acts of respond-
ent. But, this nevertheless left open and did not conflict 
with the possibility of partnership liability which the 
appellants presented and wanted to have decided. 
Issues Presented By the Parties Ignored: 
So that the parties here on both sides extensively 
briefed and argued this partnership theory of liability, 
and yet it is not even adverted to in the opinion. In 
fact, there was only one other legal question that was 
briefed at all, and it was not contested by appellants. 
This has very little materiality now, but we advert 
to it briefly because of a misunderstanding in the opinion 
on it. 
The opinion says that our principal contention is 
"that the conclusion of conversation by Athas is nul-
lified by the specific facts alleged." There may be some 
basis for this misconception in our brief, but it misses 
the actual point of our contention. 
We have never thought, or contended that any con-
clusion of conversion by respondent Athas was alleged, 
so we have never tried to nullify that. We did contend 
in our brief (P. 22-27) that the language quoted above, 
that defendants had refused "to account, and that, ther-e-
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fore, • • • had converted the value thereof" was not an 
allegation of conversion at all, as it plainly isn't. 
'Ve also contended and cited this authority for the 
proposition that where facts were alleged and asserted 
as constituting a conversion, that no different theory of 
conversion could be based on the mere use of the word 
"converted" or "conversion." 
We still think the law cited is good sound law, which 
makes appellant's theory of vicarious partnership lia-
bility the only one available here. It also limits the 
language above quoted, in which the term "converted" 
was used, to the basis pleaded. 
We come again to the application of the law quoted 
hereinabove, on "Limitation to the Theory Presented 
below" as applied by this and other appellate courts. 
And we come also to the application of the principle 
that Appellate Courts will not decide, or even enter into, 
matters which have not been raised and presented. 
3 .Am. Jur. 361: 
"820. Limitation to Matters Presented to, 
and Passed upon by, the Lower Court. An appel-
late court will decline to enter upon a discussion 
of questions which have not arisen in the case 
and probably never will arise. It will not, ordi-
narily, consider matters which were not presented 
to the trial court or passed upon therein, even for 
the purpose of advising the trial court of the 
action it ought to take on their being subsequently 
presented for consideration." 
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This Court not only in Lepasotis v. Dinsdale, 242 
P. 2d 297, supra, but in about a hundred other cases, 
has said, in different ways, that it would not consider 
or review claims which opposing parties had not had 
the opportunity, or "cannot defend against," or which 
were not by proper assignment or statement of error 
presented. 
We do not repeat the authorities cited at our brief 
(P. 22-27) but we think there is no escape here from 
the rule there supported, that: 
"Where a pleading contains both general 
and specific averments * * * a conclusion and 
also the facts from which it is drawn, * * * 
the specific averments or special facts are con-
trolling, and the general allegations will be dis-
regarded as immaterial." 
CONCLUSION 
We have shown, we believe, that the opinion does 
not follow the Rules. 
That the failure to hold that affirmance of the Trial 
Court's decision and the judgment of dismissal after 
refusal to amend, pursuant to Rule 12 (e), ends this case, 
is a complete nullification of that Rule. 
The opinion on this point also by the statement that 
the Trial Court could not consistently decide this motion 
sets up a rule of practice as to all motions covered by 
Rule 12, which appears to be contrary thereto, and is 
clearly contrary to the settled law as heretofore applied. 
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The other state1nent as to appellant's lack of reli-
ance on its appeal on this ground is wrong by the record 
above quoted. 
As to Division II of our motion, the opinion seems 
to us to impose an unwanted theory of liability, and 
that this theory is contrary to the factual claim asserted 
by appellant, and is, therefore, contrary to the law 
applicable here. 
Wherefore, respondent respectfully asks that his 
petition for a rehearing be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER 
AND EDWARD L. MULLINER, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CHRIS E. ATHAS 
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